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ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
PERSISTENT WHITE SUPREMACY, RELENTLESS
ANTI-BLACKNESS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
Nancy A. Heitzeg, Ph.D.1
PART I. INTRODUCTION
White supremacy - once writ large in the law via slavery and
Jim Crow segregation – was removed from its legalized pedestal with
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
finally, The Fair Housing Act of 1968.2 The law became “raceneutral” and it now suddenly was illegal to discriminate on the basis
on race – in housing, employment, public accommodations and
access to the franchise. Advocates hoped that this legislation would
finally bring to fruition the overdue promise of the Civil War
Amendments, long subverted via both legislation and judicial
interpretation.3
These strokes of the pen, of course, could not remove bigotry
long steeped in racist archetypes; nor could this legislation remove
1
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the structural barriers of nearly 400 years of white racial preference
and cumulative advantage in the accumulation of wealth and
property, access to education and housing, health and well-being, and
all matter of social opportunities.4 Racism, as both white
supremacist/anti-black ideology and institutionalized arrangement,
remains merely transformed with its systemic foundations intact.
Segregation in housing and education persists at levels beyond that
noted in Brown v. Board of Education, racial wealth gaps grow, and
racial disparities in criminal injustice proliferate at a pace that has led
to the label “The New Jim Crow”. 5
In tragic irony, the Civil Rights Act’s requirement of raceneutrality has perhaps ushered in an era of more insidious de facto
discrimination that is now denied through “color-blind” rhetoric. A
large body of research documents the paradigmatic shift from overt
essentialist racism to color-blindness.6 This style of racism relies
heavily on ideological frames and linguistic shifts which allow
whites to assert they “do not see race,” deny structural racism, claim
a level playing field that now victimizes them with “reverse
discrimination” and appeals to the “race card,” and argue that any
discussion of race/racism is, in fact, racist and only serves to foment
divisions rather than reflect/redress societal realities. “Color-blind
racism” also creates a set of code terms that implicitly indict people
of color without ever mentioning race.7
In the Post-Civil Rights Era, the color-blind paradigm has
become deeply ensconced in law and politics. Continued movement
towards “race-neutrality” is the hallmark of a series of Supreme
Court decisions that deny the role of institutionalized racism and
increasingly limit the role of race in constitutional remedies for
inequality in matters of affirmative action and educational access,
4
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voting rights, and all matters of criminal injustice.8 Criminal justice
– as it did post- Reconstruction – continues to play a central role in
the continued subjugation of Blacks, in particular, and will serve as
the central example of both past and current patterns of
discrimination.
On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the passage of the
Civil Rights Act, we must again raise questions about its ultimate
impact on racial justice. While this legislation made a substantial
contribution to effectively dislodging white supremacy from the law,
the call instead to race-neutrality left anti-blackness unchallenged.
The result, buttressed by judicial interpretations that further limit the
consideration of race and the proliferation of color-blind rhetoric
throughout popular and political discourse, has resulted in a situation
of continued subjugation, particularly through the criminal justice
system. One must ask – given Constitutional history, Supreme Court
rulings that grind at a snail’s pace from the legitimation of slavery
and exclusion to segregation to no consideration, and legislative
lethargy – what are the pathways towards racial redress and equal
protection of the law?
PART II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT IN HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL CONTEXT
An analysis of the “success” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
must be centered in a larger discussion of the role of law generally in
shaping our constructions of race. The theoretical perspective of
Critical Race Theory (CRT), supplemented with the data of the social
sciences, guides the analysis here. CRT, from the outset, raised
crucial questions as to the ability of law to produce racial equality. In
fact, CRT is grounded in “an analysis of how law helped constitute
the very racial structure that antidiscrimination law aimed to

8
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regulate.”9 CRT proceeds from the premise that racial privilege and
related oppression is deeply rooted in both our history and law, thus
making as racism a “normal and ingrained feature of our
landscape”;10 CRT further offers a critique of Civil Rights legal
reforms in specific, by noting that these have failed to fundamentally
challenge racial inequality. As Bell observes, “the subordination of
blacks seems to reassure whites of an unspoken, but no less certain,
property right in their whiteness.” 11
While all communities of color suffer from racism in general
and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has
been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black
racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the
two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and
every day constructions of race in the United States.12 For this
reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of
African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison
industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in
which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African
Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness in both law and practice.
While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is
indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and
elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”
norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing
“other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13 The socio-political construction of race coincides with the
age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and
perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the
solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the
9
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capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.
By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or
slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the
Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of
debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less
than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of
1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly
drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result
according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what
we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially
pro-slavery”.16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future
bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation
through escape were all clear indications of the significance of
slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the
Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”
to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.
17

The social and constitutional construction of white as free and
Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.
According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,
may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.18 These
property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those
who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and
to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders
of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:
The concept of whiteness was premised on white
supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was
defined and constructed in ways that increased its
value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as
14

FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME, supra note 2, at 32-33.
Bell, supra note 3, at 4.
16
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:
VOLUME 4, RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955).
17
Bell, supra note 4, at 6.
18
Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 8, 1707-91 (1993).
19
Id.
15

36.1

ANTI-BLACKNESS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW

59

whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,
whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the
very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept
of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial
subjugation. This fact was particularly evident
during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,
as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the
form of status property.20
Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of
humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the
margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as
Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in
America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and
no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an
experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”21 Directly
condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded
groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,
Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an
outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22
Any doubts as to the centrality of white supremacy built on
anti-blackness were erased in the case of Scot v. Sanford (1857),
where a majority of the Supreme Court denied the citizenship claims
of Dred Scott and went further to declare that The Missouri
Compromise requirement of balance between free and slave states in
the expanding United States was a violation of the due process rights
of slave holders.23 Referring to the legal status of African Americans,
Justice Taney’s opinion for the majority makes it painfully clear,

20
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They are not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the
rights and privileges which that instrument provides
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On
the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had
been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them..24
Given the harsh judicial pronouncements here – never overruled – the legal status of African Americans remains in many
respects, the after-life of the slave, still subject to stiff neo-slave
forms of total legal social control, i.e. convict lease and the prison
industrial complex,, despite Constitutional Amendments, Federal
Civil Rights legislation, and executive measures.
PART III. WHITE SUPREMACY, ANTI-BLACKNESS
AND THE AFTERLIFE OF SLAVERY IN THE LAW
In the post -bellum era, the stain of slavery has been
impossible to remove. Constitutional Amendments, Supreme Court
rulings, and legislation notwithstanding, the exploitation of
captive/caged Black labor continues, largely uninterrupted. As
Dillon observes:
Slavery’s production of social and biological death did not
end with emancipation, did not cease with the end of segregation, and
refused to heed under civil rights legislation. Its logic and power

24
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exceeds the realm of law. The past comes back not just to haunt, but
to structure and drive the contemporary operations of power.25
The primary mechanism for the perpetual denial of full
citizenship has been the criminal law, with its attendant systems of
policing and punishment. As Frederick Douglas observed nearly 150
years ago, there is no escaping “the general disposition in this country
to impute crime to color.”26 Post slavery, the criminalizing narrative
has been a central cultural feature of on-going efforts at oppression;
from convict lease/plantain prison farms to the contemporary prison
industrial complex, the control of black bodies for profit has been
furthered by the criminal justice system.
A substantial body of work documents the post -bellum
transformation of Black Codes into Slave Codes, slave patrols into
police forces, plantations into prisons, and, in to post-Civil Rights
era, into the contemporary prison industrial complex.27 At no point
was the law able to stop this; to the contrary, the law and its
enforcement apparatus remain consistent, albeit shifting,
centerpieces of white supremacy and anti-Blackness.
A. THE POST -BELLUM ERA: CONVICT LEASE
AND PLANATION PRISONS
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the passage of the 13th, 14th,
and 15th Amendments seemed to promise an end the abolition of
slavery, due process and equal protection at both state and federal
levels, and full citizenship via the franchise (at least for Black men).
Angela Y. Davis, in Are Prisons Obsolete?, traces the initial
rise of the penitentiary system to the abolition of slavery; “[I]n the
immediate aftermath of slavery, the southern states hastened to
develop a criminal justice system that could legally restrict the

25
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possibilities of freedom for the newly released slaves.”28 There was
a subsequent transformation of the Slave Codes into the Black Codes
and the plantations into prisons. Southern states quickly passed laws
that echoed the restrictions associated with slavery, re-inscribed the
property interests of “whiteness,” and criminalized a range of
activities of the perpetrator was black.29 These laws were enforced
by former slave patrols turned police agencies, with the assistance of
extra-legal militias, and the white citizenry in general, who are
merely protected by these same police, but per Wilderson “not
simply “protected” by the police, they are — in their very
corporeality — the police.”30
All this becomes possible because the 13th Amendment –
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in the United
States” – contained a dangerous loophole- “except as a punishment
for crime.” This allowed for the conversion of the old plantations to
penitentiaries – the 18,000 acre Louisiana Penitentiary at Angola is a
case in point – and the creation of prison “farms” such as Parchmann
in Mississippi and the infamous Tucker Prison Farm and Cummins
Prison Farm in Arkansas.31 Sheriffs, jailors and wardens leased out
entire prisons to private contractors who literally worked thousands
of prisoners to death in labor camps, on chain gangs, and in prison
farms. These prisoners were largely black; in the post-Civil War
South the racial composition of prison and jail populations shifted
dramatically from majority White to majority Black, and in many
states increased ten-fold.32 As Davis notes, “the expansion of the
convict lease system and the county chain gang meant that the
antebellum criminal justice system, defined criminal justice largely
as a means for controlling black labor.”33

28
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The re-institutionalization of slavery via the criminal legal
system also served to effectively undo the newly acquired 15th
Amendment right to vote. This was legislatively curtailed by the
tailoring of felony disenfranchisement laws to include crimes that
were supposedly more frequently committed by blacks. In the postCivil War period, existing felony disenfranchisement laws were
expanded dramatically, especially in the South, and modified to
include even minor offenses. This legislation, in combination with
literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses and ultimately, the threat
of white terror, essentially denied Blacks the right to vote until the
mid-twentieth century.
The 14th Amendment’s promise of due process and equal
protection was insufficient to override this continued economic
exploitation and civic exclusion. This was due to a series of Supreme
Court rulings that interpreted the 14th in support of state’s rights,
white supremacy, and against Black inclusion. In United States v.
Cruikshank (1876), the Supreme Court ruled that that “The
fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.” 34This
decision, in a case involving the bloody Colfax Massacre, forbade
the Federal Government from relying on the Enforcement Act of
1870 to prosecute actions by white paramilitary groups that had been
violently suppressing the Black vote. 35 This decision paved the way
for nearly a century of unchecked white extra-legal violence and
lynching that served to enforce white supremacy in both law and
practice.
On matters of racial equality, the most famous Supreme Court
ruling of the era was Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).36 Post slavery, white
supremacy in the law was accomplished by the introduction of a
series of segregationist Jim Crow laws that mandated Black
exclusion from white spaces, even in public accommodations. In a
challenge to legalized segregation of public transportation in the state
34
35
36
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of Louisiana, Plessy argues that these laws have denied him equality
before the law. The majority disagrees and sets forth the principle of
“separate but equal.” Justice Brown (1896) writes for the majority,
It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in an mixed
community, the reputation of belonging to the
dominant race, in this instance the white race, is
‘property,’ in the same sense that a right of action or
of inheritance is property. . . We are unable to see
how this statute deprives him of, or in any way
affects his right to, such property. If he be a white
man, and assigned to a colored coach, he may have
his action for damages against the company for being
deprived of his so-called ‘property.’ Upon the other
hand, if he be a colored man, and be so assigned, he
has been deprived of no property, since he is not
lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white
man.37
The sole dissenter in Plessy sets up the juxtaposition between
Jim Crow and color-blindness that frames the contemporary debate
on race today. Justice Harlan, while acknowledging the reality of
white supremacy, decries its support with the law, but with cold
comfort:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race
in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power.
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if
it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of
the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
37

Id.
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among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law.38
Even post-Emancipation, Blacks had no claim to the property
rights of whiteness, nor full and equal access to rights of citizenship
that entailed. White supremacy and anti-Blackness persisted in law,
even in the face of Amendments to the Constitution, which purported
to undo the same.
B. THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA,
INCARCERATION AND “COLOR-BLINDNESS

MASS

The Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. the Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) is often used as the benchmark
for chronicling the start of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s
and 1960s.39 The Court’s unanimous rejection of Plessy’s “separate
but equal” provided a new Federal framework with which to
challenge Jim Crow segregation on the state and local levels. It
offered the back drop for the Montgomery bus boycott, the resistance
in Birmingham, Bloody Sunday, the voter registration drives of
Freedom Summer, and ultimately, passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, The Voting Right Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
and the 24th Amendment to the Constitution.40
While there was hope again that the law itself could be
pressed into the service of racial equality, those victories now seem
bittersweet. Bell argues that the Brown decision and the ensuing
Federal legislation were “silent covenants” of interest-convergence,
where “perceived self-interest of whites rather than the racial
injustices suffered by Blacks have been the major motivation in
racial-remediation policies.” 41 Judge Robert L. Carter, one of the
attorneys who argued Brown goes further, “. . .the fundamental vice
was not legally enforced racial segregation itself; this was a mere by-

38
39
40
41
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product, a symptom of the greater and more pernicious disease white supremacy.” 42 Legally supported segregation was uprooted
without dislodging either white supremacy or anti-Blackness, now
cloaked in race-neutral rhetoric of “color-blindness”.
The “color-blind” Constitution and the race-neutral
requirement of Federal Civil Rights legislation now serves as
convenient cover for the persistence of institutionalized racism.
Racially coded but race-neutral rhetoric is widely used in debates
over welfare reform, affirmative action, and particularly “law and
order” criminal justice policy;43 in all these cases, the coded racial
sub-text reads clearly, and the resultant policies, while purportedly
“race neutral,” have resulted in disproportionate harm to people of
color, especially African Americans. While race is now widely the
text/subtext of political debate, systemic racism still remains largely
absent from either political discourse or policy debates of all sorts,
including those related to criminal injustice.
In the Post-Civil Rights Era, there has been a corresponding
shift from de jure racism codified explicitly into the law and legal
systems to a de facto racism where people of color, especially
African Americans, are subject to unequal protection of the laws,
excessive surveillance, police terror, extreme segregation, a brutal
and biased death penalty, and neo-slave labor via incarceration all in
the name of “crime control.”44 “Law and order” criminal justice
policies are all guided by thinly coded appeals to white fears of high
crime neighborhoods, “crack epidemics,” gang proliferation,

42

MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL.,
BLIND SOCIETY (2005).
43
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See generally, Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261
(2007); KATHRYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME (2d ed. 2009);
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(Duke Univ. Press 2009).
44
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juvenile super – predators, urban unrest, school violence, and more.
In all these case, the sub-text reads clearly — fear of brown and
especially Black people.
As before, law, policing and punishment are central to the ongoing exclusion of Blacks from civic life. Post slavery, the
criminalizing narrative was a cultural feature of on-going efforts at
oppression; from convict lease/plantain prison farms to the
contemporary prison industrial complex the control of black bodies
for profit has been furthered by the criminal justice system.45 “Slave
Codes” become Black Codes and now Black Codes become gang
legislation, three-strikes and the War on Drugs in the persistent
condemnation of Blackness.46 As before, the criminal legal system is
the primary mechanism for undoing the promised protections of
Federal Civil Rights legislation and constitutes again, the major
affront to the fulfillment of the 13th, 14th and 25th Amendments.
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world, with a population of 2.3 million behind bars that constitutes
25% of the world’s prisoners.47 The increased rate of incarceration
can be traced to the War on Drugs and the rise of lengthy mandatory
minimum prison sentences for drug crimes and other felonies. These
policies have proliferated, not in response to crime rate or any
empirical data that indicates their effectiveness, due to newfound
sources of profit for prisons.48 As Brewer and Heitzeg (2008)
observe:
The prison industrial complex is a self-perpetuating
machine where the vast profits (e.g. cheap labor,
private and public supply and construction contracts,
45

Davis, supra note 27.
SAMUEL WALKER, C. SPOHN, & M. DELONE, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE,
ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA (5th ed. 2012); KHAHIL G. MUHAMMAD, THE
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AMERICA
(Harvard
Univ.
Press
2010),
available
at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html.
47
Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (2014).
48
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46
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job creation, continued media profits from
exaggerated crime reporting and crime/punishment
as entertainment) and perceived political benefits
(e.g. reduced unemployment rates, “get tough on
crime” and public safety rhetoric, funding increases
for police, and criminal justice system agencies and
professionals) lead to policies that are additionally
designed to insure an endless supply of “clients” for
the criminal justice system (e.g. enhanced police
presence in poor neighborhoods and communities of
color; racial profiling; decreased funding for public
education combined with zero-tolerance policies and
increased rates of expulsion for students of color;
increased rates of adult certification for juvenile
offenders; mandatory minimum and “three-strikes”
sentencing; draconian conditions of incarceration
and a reduction of prison services that contribute to
the likelihood of “recidivism”; “collateral
consequences”-such as felony disenfranchisement,
prohibitions on welfare receipt, public housing, gun
ownership, voting and political participation,
employment- that nearly guarantee continued
participation in “crime” and return to the prison
industrial complex following initial release.)49
The 13th Amendment claim of abolition remains unfulfilled,
as the neo- slavery of the prison industrial complex becomes the
current vehicle for controlling Black bodies for political and
economic gain. The trend towards mass incarceration is marred by
racial disparity. While 1 in 35 adults is under correctional supervision
and 1 in every 100 adults is in prison, 1 in every 36 Latino adults , 1
in every 15 black men, 1 in every 100 black women, and 1 in 9 black

49
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men ages 20 to 34 are incarcerated.50 Despite no statistical
differences in rates of offending, approximately 50% of all prisoners
are black, 30% are white, and 20% are Latino;.51 These disparities
are indicative of differential enforcement practices rather than any
differences in criminal participation. This is particularly true of drug
crimes, which account for the bulk of the increased prison
population. Even though Blacks and whites use and sell drugs at
comparable rates, African Americans are anywhere from 3 to 10
times more likely to be arrested, and additionally likely to receive
harsher sentences than their white counterparts.52
It is no mistake that the subtitle of Michelle Alexander’s epic
indictment of The New Jim Crow is this: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Color-blindness 53 The Drug War, from start to finish, has
always been racist: draconian sentences, crack versus powder
disparities, police patrol patterns, stop/frisk practices, racial profiling
and death at the hands of law enforcement, arrests, convictions,
sentencing including death and incarceration, and collateral
consequences that include bans on voting, bars to employment,
education, housing and economic assistance, and the diminishment
of parental rights, all fall heaviest on Blacks.54 This racial disparity
is by design. As Alexander observes criminal justice policies serve
to regulate and segregate communities of color in the Post-Civil
Rights era:
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What has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow has less to
do with the basic structure of our society than with the language we
use to justify it. In the era of colorblindness, it is no longer socially
permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justification for
discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt. So we don’t. Rather
than rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people
of color “criminals” and then engage in all the practices we
supposedly left behind. Today it is perfectly legal to discriminate
against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal to
discriminate against African Americans. Once you’re labeled a felon,
the old forms of discrimination—employment discrimination,
housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of
educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public
benefits, and exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal. As a
criminal you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect,
than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We
have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned
it.55
We are still not saved by the 14th Amendment. In the PostCivil Rights Era, the Supreme Court has followed the color-blind
logic of the sole dissenter in Plessy and solidified the race-neutral
implications of Federal Civil Rights legislation. Color-blindness as
the new legal doctrine begins to emerge – despite judicial dissent –
in cases involving affirmative action and other remedied to centuries
of racial inequality. The Supreme Court adopts the color-blind model
in The Board of Regents, University of California v. Bakke (1978),
where the ruling is in favor of a white student who claimed racial
discrimination in his denial of admission to medical school.56 If the
Constitution is to be color-blind, race can only be considered with
“strict scrutiny,” even as a remedy for past discrimination. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, in separate dissents, point out the flaws of this
approach. Brennan observes,
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Claims that law must be “color-blind” or that the
datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy
must be seen as aspiration rather than as description
of reality. . . for reality rebukes us that race has too
often been used by those who would stigmatize and
oppress minorities. Yet we cannot . . . let color
blindness become myopia which masks the reality
that many “created equal” have been treated within
our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their
fellow citizens.” 57
Justice Marshall’s dissent echoes the warning, one that has
now come to pass;
For it must be remembered that, during most of the
past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and
pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro.
Now, when a state acts to remedy the effects of that
legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this
same Constitution stands as a barrier. 58
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is perhaps the most significant
case of the Post-Civil Rights era with respect to the application of the
14th Amendment as to matter of race.59 It is here that potential for an
interpretation that would allow for real remedies for institutionalized
discrimination is presented and denied. The racial disparity that
characterizes all criminal justice has been most obvious and
contested in the application of capital punishment, especially in the
South, where the “killing state” stepped to do what was once the work
of extra-legal lynch mobs.60 After a series of death penalty cases
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where the Court ruled that racial discrimination in the application of
the criminal laws’ ultimate penalty must be addressed, it is here that
the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision clearly defines discrimination as
individual not institutionalized. Citing statistical evidence from the
now famous Baldus study, McCleskey argued that the application of
the death penalty in Georgia was fraught with systemic patterns of
racism that transcended but tainted any particular case. Defendants
charged with killing white victims were more likely to receive the
death penalty, and, in fact, cases involving black defendants and
white victims were more likely to result in a sentence of death than
cases involving any other racial combination.61 The majority did not
dispute the statistical evidence, but feared the consequences. If the
Court accepted McCleskey’s claim, then the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment would apply to patterns of discrimination, to
institutionalized racism and sexism, to questions of structured
inequality. It could, in fact, be used to challenge the very foundations
of the criminal justice system itself, start to finish: laws with
disproportionate racial impact, racial profiling and racial bias in
police use of force, and prosecutorial discretion. These fears are
expressed in Powell’s opinion for the majority,
“First, McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, throws into serious question the
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in
application to capital punishment, but applies to all
penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim
that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with
similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover,
the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant
factor of race easily could be extended to apply to
claims based on unexplained discrepancies that
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correlate to membership in other minority groups,
and even to gender.62
In the majority’s view, equal protection of the laws was for
individuals, not oppressed groups, and discrimination must be
intentional and similarly individual. McCleskey closed off the last
best avenue for remedying structural inequality with the law itself,
and preserved the color-blind veneer at the expense of racial remedy.
Justice Brennan’s impassioned dissent makes the implications of this
decision clear:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey
doubtless asked his lawyer whether a jury was likely
to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question
would have been disturbing. First, counsel would
have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the
crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were
more important than the fact that his victim was
white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell
McCleskey that defendants charged with killing
white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be
sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing
blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the
disclosure that it was more likely than not that the
race of McCleskey’s victim would determine
whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every 11
defendants convicted of killing a white person would
not have received the death penalty if their victims
had been black. While, among defendants with
aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to
McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would not have been
sentenced to die if their victims had been black.
Finally, the assessment would not be complete
without the information that cases involving black
defendants and white victims are more likely to result
62
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in a death sentence than cases featuring any other
racial combination of defendant and victim. Ibid. The
story could be told in a variety of ways, but
McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential
narrative line: there was a significant chance that race
would play a prominent role in determining if he
lived or died. . .
At the time our Constitution was framed 200 years
ago this year, blacks had for more than a century
before been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect. Only 130 years ago, this Court
relied on these observations to deny American
citizenship to blacks. Ibid. A mere three generations
ago, this Court sanctioned racial segregation, stating
that “[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them
upon the same plane.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 552 (1896). In more recent times, we have
sought to free ourselves from the burden of this
history. Yet it has been scarcely a generation since
this Court’s first decision striking down racial
segregation, and barely two decades since the
legislative prohibition of racial discrimination in
major domains of national life. These have been
honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that, in three
decades, we have completely escaped the grip of a
historical legacy spanning centuries Warren
McCleskey’s evidence confronts us with the subtle
and persistent influence of the past. His message is a
disturbing one to a society that has formally
repudiated racism, and a frustrating one to a Nation
accustomed to regarding its destiny as the product of
its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at our peril,
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for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we
deny its influence in the present. 63
Well into the 21st Century, Supreme Court decisions continue
to erode Federal Civil Rights legal gains and the ability of the Civil
War Amendments to provide racial redress. The doctrine of strict
scrutiny itself continues to be eroded further as the current Supreme
Court limits its application and as a series of subsequent cases from
Grutter v Bollinger (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) to Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin (2014) and Shelby County v. Holder
(2012) have shown, the Constitution has indeed erected a legal
barrier with claims of colorblindness.64 Worse still, as Crenshaw
notes, the shift even beyond color-blindness towards claims of “postracial pragmatism,”
This pragmatism jettisons the liberal ambivalence
about race consciousness to embrace a colorblind
stance even as it foregrounds and celebrates the
achievement of particular racial outcomes. In the
new post-racial moment, the pragmatist may be
agnostic about the conservative erasure of race as a
contemporary phenomenon but may still march
under the same premise that significant progress can
be made without race consciousness. . ..
Colorblindness as doctrine not only undermines litigation
strategies that rely on race-conscious remediation, but it also soothes
social anxiety about whether deeper levels of social criticism,
remediation, and reconstruction might be warranted. While
colorblindness declared racism as a closed chapter in our history,
post-racialism now provides reassurance to those who weren’t fully
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convinced that this history had ceased to cast its long shadow over
contemporary affairs. Post-racialism offers a gentler escape, an
appeal to the possibility that racial power can be side stepped,
finessed and ultimately overcome by regarding dominance as merely
circumstance that need not get in the way of social progress.
As post-racialism becomes the vehicle for a colorblind
agenda, the material consequences of racial exploitation and social
violence— including the persistence of educational inequity, the
disproportionate racial patterns of criminalization and incarceration,
and the deepening patterns of economic stratification—slide further
into obscurity.65
More than a century after the Civil War Amendments, 60
years since Brown, 50 years since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
we are here, with white supremacy and anti-Blackness intact, but
now masked, and with slavery (unwilling to die) transformed yet
again. Still, the law, unwilling and unable to offer relief, but worse
still, at the center of this exclusionary endeavor, from the outset to
the present, remains the definer and purveyor of Black social, civil
and literal death.
PART VI. REMEDIES?
Despite centuries of death-defying movements and oft wellintended legislation, the essential story line and structural reality of
white supremacy/anti-Blackness remains foundationally intact.
While there has been progress for some, enough to reinforce the
claims of a post-racial era, the mainstay, the historical sway of a
slavery rooted in both racism and profit, lingers, transformed over
and again from “the prison of slavery to the slavery of prison.”66 This
same phenomena is called by many names. All the powers of the law
- Constitutional amendments, Federal Civil Rights legislation,
Supreme Court rulings - have failed to stymie this trend, and as we
have seen, have often allowed and re-enforced the same.
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In the Post-Civil Rights era, efforts to resist are complicated
by the insidious cover story created by the paradigm of “color-blind”
racism and its corresponding entrenchment in now “race-neutral”
law. All matter of inequality is masked by claims of legal equality,
but nowhere more so than with regard to the extensive and excessive
reliance on mass incarceration.67 Criminality has become conflated
nearly entirely with Blackness, and the entire machinery of it rests on
an unspoken understanding that the property rights of “whiteness”
rest now (as always) on the exclusion, the caging, and the execution
of Black bodies. The law supports this, still.
In light of this, what remedies then remain? The usual calls
for still more legal reform, perhaps for reparations, the hope for a
more radical future Supreme Court reading of McCleskey seem too
distant, too abstract, and perhaps too, destined to fail at addressing
the deep roots of the possessive investment in slavery.68 Perhaps the
most fruitful approach is evidenced in the prison abolition
movement, which explicitly recognizes the contemporary prison
industrial complex as an extension of slavery and later, convict
lease.69 As such, the call now, as then, must be for abolition. Angela
Davis describes the movement as follows:
Prison abolition, like the abolition of slavery, is a
long-range goal and the handbook argues that an
abolitionist approach requires an analysis of “crime”
that links it with social structures, as opposed to
individual pathology, as well as “anticrime”
strategies that focus on the provision of social
resources. Of course, there are many versions of
prison abolitionism—including those that propose to
abolish punishment altogether and replace it with
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reconciliatory responses to criminal acts. In my
opinion, the most powerful relevance of abolitionist
theory and practice today resides in the fact that
without a radical position vis-a-vis the rapidly
expanding prison system, prison architecture, prison
surveillance, and prison system corporatization,
prison culture, with all its racist and totalitarian
implications, will continue not only to claim ever
increasing numbers of people of color, but also to
shape social relations more generally in our society.
Prison needs to be abolished as the dominant mode
of addressing social problems that are better solved
by other institutions and other means. The call for
prison abolition urges us to imagine and strive for a
very different social landscape.70
Even here, there is the danger that the prison abolition
movement will attend to the dismantling of an essential structure of
white supremacy without fully grappling at root with the antiBlackness that serves as corollary. At the time of this writing, the
nation is divided again for the most recent in an ongoing spate of
“new 21st century version of lynchings”.71 Police and vigilante
killings of unarmed Blacks, now occur at the rate of 1 every 28
hours.72 New research verifies what some have already known with
their lives, that Black children are seen, by police and others, as older
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by far— in fact not seen as children as all.73 New research too
suggests that white Americans are more comfortable with punitive
and harsh policing and sentencing when they imagine that the people
being policed and put in prison are black. This is mediated by fear;
the idea of black criminals inspires higher anxiety than that of white
criminals, pressing white people to want stronger law enforce
enforcement.74 While these sentiments and actions are rooted in the
desire to protect the property of “whiteness,’ this is always over and
against the perceived intrusion of excluded Blackness.
In the final analysis, it is the long shadow of anti-Blackness
that must be confronted. All legal, political, and social movement
efforts to dismantle white supremacist institutions will fail in lieu of
this. These will be half measures until, at last, there is
acknowledgement and embrace of the “Black specter waiting in the
wings. . . .that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must
nonetheless be pursued to the death.”75
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